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The existence of a correlation between female presence on boards and
performance of the firm has been noted, at least among Fortune 500
companies. For example, one analysis found that a high proportion of
m14U2 12 p `1,*)2U Gbb W14.p2j:+ o1p,V O+ p++1WOp*UV mO*P +OQ2OROWp2*Lj
higher return on sales and return on invested capital. 1 Similarly, a more
recent analysis found that firms with diverse boards among the Fortune 500
see nearly 2% greater ret),2 12 p++U*+ h“?AA”g *Pp2 RO,4+ mO*P 4pLU-only
boards.2
Similar relationships have been uncovered by other researchers, with
some analyses indicating that companies with more women involved in
leadership positions tend to outperform their sector in terms of return on
equity, operating result, and stock price growth. AWW1,VO2Q *1 YW[O2+Uj:+
2015 report Why Diversity Matters, businesses with a greater proportion of
women on their boards outperformed rivals in terms of returns on invested
capital, returns on equity, and sales.3 Specifically, the report found that
gender-diverse companies are 15% more likely to outperform their peers. 4
Furthermore, a recent Deloitte Australian research study shows that in teambased assessments, inclusive teams outperform otherwise identical
counterparts.5 Similar correlative analyses find that on their face, more
diverse boards are associated with improved firm performance across a
number of metrics.6
1. Lois Joy et al., The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s
Representation on Boards, CATALYST (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Bo
ttom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_on_Boards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7ZR-FF3Q].
2. Francesca Lagerberg, Women in Business: The Value of Diversity, GRANT THORTON
(2015), https://www.grantthornton.global/globalassets/wib_value_of_diversity.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6VRK-DZNB].
3. Vivian Hunt et al., Why Diversity Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (2015), https://www.m
ckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/why-diversity-matters
[https://perma.cc/QFQ6-9JFB].
4. Id. at 1.
5. Juliet Bourke & Bernadette Dillon, The Diversity and Inclusion Resolution, Eight
Powerful Truths, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/
en/deloitte-review/issue-22/diversity-and-inclusion-at-work-eight-powerful-truths.html
[https://perma.cc/493X-Y92H].
6. See infra Part I(B) and accompanying notes 54-60 (discussing the impact of diverse
boards on non-financial metrics).
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It should be noted, however, that correlative studies do not establish
causality.7 Some industry studies, like those conducted by Catalyst, include
p2 Uk.LOWO* R11*21*U *Pp* “W1,,ULp*O12 V1U+ 21* .,1(U 1, O4.Lj Wp)+p*O12d”8
A*PU,+f LOMU p _,p2* =P1,2*12 +*)Vjf 21*U *PU “1..1,*)2O*j W1+*” O2 *U,4+ 1R
ROA as a result of a dearth of female board members. 9 One study, while
establishing a positive relationship between board gender diversity and some
indicators of firm performance provides evidence of causality from board
diversity to firm performance as a result of female presence on the audit
committee (as opposed to the compensation and nomination committees). 10
The results, however, were statistically weak, hence the authors state that
“VUWO+O12+ W12WU,2O2Q *PU p..1O2*4U2* 1R m14U2 1, U*P2OW 4O21,O*OU+ *1
corporate boards should be based on criteria other than future financial
.U,R1,4p2WUd” 11 Similar studies have arrived at equally ambiguous results. 12
These ambiguities have led some researchers to suggest that practical
interpretation of these correlations, along with corresponding policy
prescriptions, are essentially impossible due to the ambiguity of the
relationship between board diversity and firm performance.13
Yet, there are plausible arguments that a diverse board may signal
independence, creative thought, opportunities for break-out strategies and an
open-mindedness on the part of the company14, which are increasingly
important in the global marketplace.15 In a review of the then existing
7. See, e.g., Lagerberg, supra note 2 (extrapolating observed premiums on returns
earned by firms with women on boards and claiming that if all 1,050 studied firms added
women to the board, annual output would increase by $655 billion); Hunt et al., supra note 3
and Joy et al., supra note 1 (noting that correlation does not equal causation and explicitly
state they do not establish a causal relationship); see also Barnali Choudhury, Gender
Diversity on Boards: Beyond Quotas, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 229 (2015) (analyzing the use of
quotas as a way to increase the number of women on corporate boards).
8. Joy et al., supra note 1, at 1 n. 2.
9. Hunt et al., supra note 3.
10. David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board
Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT:L REV. 396,
401 (2010).
11. Id. at 396.
12. Helena Isidro & Márcia Sobral, The Effects of Women on Corporate Boards on Firm
Value, Financial Performance, and Ethical and Social Compliance, 132 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 1
(2014).
13. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL:Y
REV. 7 (2003).
14. Nick Wilson et al., Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards, 37
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 1369, 1384 (2013).
15. New Alliance for Board Diversity Report Finds Little Change in Diversity on
Corporate Boards, CATALYST, https://www.catalyst.org/media/new-alliance-board-diversity-
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literature on workplace diversity, Milliken and Martins found that diversity
of all sorts, including gender diversity, has generally been connected to
O4.,1(UV m1,M.LpWU 1)*W14U+ *P,1)QP *PU “2)4oU, 1R pL*U,2p*O(U+
W12+OVU,UVf -)pLO*j 1R OVUp+f VUQ,UU 1R W11.U,p*O12 O2 W14.LUk *p+M+” 16 and
other areas. Further, although members of diverse groups may
“W144)2OWp*U 41,U R1,4pLLj p2Vf .U,Pp.+f LU++ R,U-)U2*Lj mO*P UpWP 1*PU,
than members of less diverse groups . . . they may communicate more
R,U-)U2*Lj mO*P *P1+U 1)*+OVU *PU Q,1).d” 17 In addition, having women in
key positions may add value by bringing in diverse skills and creating
cultures of inclusion. 18 Furthermore, boardroom diversity may aid in
p(1OVp2WU 1R “Q,1).*PO2Mf” p W14.LpWU2Wj *Pp* 4pj LUpV *1 *PU RpOL),U 1R *PU
board to serve its monitoring role in corporate governance. 19 Other studies
have suggested that board gender diversity may be causally related with
improved compliance with ethical and social standards 20 and that diversity
may be linked to enhanced practices of corporate social responsibility
(CSR).21 These, in turn, may boost firm financial performance.
Nevertheless, the number of women in boardrooms in the United States
is still disappointingly low. Statistics show that women comprise only
19.8% of board seats of companies in the 2017 Fortune 1000 companies.22
This may be due to numerous factors including gender bias seen through
management feedback, performance recognition and reward, and promotion,
wPOWP pLL W12*,Oo)*U *1 m14U2:+ R,)+*,p*O12+ mO*P *PUO, m1,M U2(O,124U2*d 23
report-finds-little-change-diversity-corporate-boards
[https://perma.cc/59JN-GEL2]
(“Clearly, many shareholders recognize that strategic and competitive value [of boardroom
diversity], especially in a complex global marketplace”).
16. Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:
Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 402, 416 (1996).
17. Id. at 417.
18. Daehyun Kim & Laura T. Starks, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Women
Contribute Unique Skills?, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267-68 (2016).
19. Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Director Overlap: Groupthink Versus Teamwork 23 (Dec. 21
2015), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the American Economic Association)
https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2016/retrieve.php?pdfid=1209 [https://perma.cc/T8T2LC6T].
20. Isidro & Sobral, supra note 12, at 1.
21. Eunjung Hyun et al., Women on Boards and Corporate Social Responsibility, 8
SUSTAINABILITY, March 2016, at 1, 15.
22. Gender Diversity Index, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, at 2 (2018), https://www.2020wo
b.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXY2
-WC9K].
23. Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio, How Gender Bias Corrupts Performance Reviews, and What
To Do About It, HARV. BUS. REV. (2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-gender-bias-corruptsperformance-reviews-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/M5AH-A8J9].
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Additionally, we see that women sometimes face different problems at
work than their male colleagues, such as enduring sexual harassment, having
their contributions undervalued,24 and being disrespected or questioned
about their competence and productivity25 (which is exacerbated if a woman
has children). Moreover, there also exists asymmetry in the way in which
both men and women perceive one another in a workplace scenario, as they
have different views on what aspects of work should be prioritized and what
factors contribute to constructing a healthy workplace. 26 Within the
W1,.1,p*U o1p,Vf ,U+Up,WPU,+ Pp(U 21*UV *Pp* “sex-based biases or
stereotyping by male director+ 4OQP* oU O2POoO*O2Q m14U2 VO,UW*1,+: (1OWU”
within boards, which could explain why some researchers find that the
evidence regarding correlations between gender diverse boards and financial
performance is mixed. 27 Thus, there is need for targeted solutions such as
policies for equal opportunities, promotion of a gender inclusive
environment and supporting women who become mothers.
Recent trends have, fortunately, shown promise. The 2020 Gender
Diversity Index (GDI), which has been tracking female presence on
American boards since 2011, notes significant improvements in gender
parity in Fortune 1000 boards since tracking began. 28 The most recent report,
which includes data through 2017, finds that since 2011 the proportion of
Fortune 1000 firms with at least 20% female representation on boards has
climbed from just over a quarter to 55%. 29 Furthermore, since 2011, the total
proportion of female board members on Fortune 1000 boards has risen from
just below 15% to over 20%, with Fortune 100 companies seeing an increase
in proportion from just below 20% to nearly 25% in 2017. 30 This is
indicative of a broader trend: while firms near the top and bottom of the
Fortune 1000 have increased at a similar pace (the total increase in
proportion for the Fortune 100 firms over the period was 4.8%, and 6.3% for

24. Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, No Credit Where Credit is Due: Attributional Rationalization of Women’s Success in Male-Female Teams, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
905, 905 (2005).
25. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 12 AM. J.
OF SOC. 1297, 1305 (2007).
26. Michael Peterson, What Men and Women Value at Work: Implications for Workplace
Health, 1 GENDER MED., no. 2, 2004, at 106, 108.
27. Jeremy Galbreath, Are There Gender-Related Influences on Corporate
Sustainability? A Study of Women on Boards of Directors, 17 J. OF MGMT. & ORG. 17, 30
(2011); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 377, 383 (2014).
28. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 22.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 3.
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the Fortune 501-1000), the largest firms retain the lead in proportion. 31 There
is stronger progress in the European Union, where between 2010 and 2015,
the overall proportion of female board seats increased from 11.9% to
21.2%.32
Yet, not all is rosy. The U.S. continues to lag in progress compared to
the European Union, which has achieved much stronger results in a shorter
time frame.33 `),*PU,41,Uf *PU L1mU, p RO,4:+ ,p2M O2 *PU `1,*)2U Kbbbf O2
general, the lower the proportion of women on the board. 34 If the trend
among Fortune 1000 companies is extrapolated to the 4000-odd35 listed firms
in the U.S., it suggests a much grimmer situation for the majority of firms.
Moreover, even the best performers, the top 100 companies in the U.S., still
have barely a quarter of their board seats filled with women, a long shot from
parity; progress has continued to be slow during the time data has been
recorded by the GDI. 36
This Article addresses the role of gender diversity in corporate
governance. It begins in Part I with a review of studies analyzing gender
diversity and firm performance. Part II follows with consideration of gender
inequality in the workplace, with a focus on role incongruity, continuing in
Part III with analysis of sexual harassment. Part IV focuses on potential
solutions followed by concluding remarks.
I.

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

Although the presence of women on corporate boards has been steadily
growing over the last several decades, female board membership still lags
behind the equitable ideal. Between 2014 and 2015 alone, the proportion of
women directors worldwide increased from 12.4% to 15%, with nations like
Norway and France seeing about 35% female representation on the boards
of major corporations. 37 And while egalitarian impulses have motivated
some of the moves to introduce women into the boardroom, in recent years
31. Id.
32. 8',p \1),1(/f Gender Balance on Corporate Boards: Europe is Cracking the Glass
Ceiling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (July 2016), ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id
=46280 [https://perma.cc/L9FZ-HCFJ].
33. Id.
34. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 22, at 3.
35. Four thousand, three hundred and thirty-one firms were listed as of 2016. Listed
Domestic Companies, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LD
OM.NO [https://perma.cc/7RVG-HYJW].
36. Joy et al., supra note 1.
37. Linda-Eling Lee et al., Women on Boards: Global Trends in Gender Diversity on
Corporate Boards, MSCI, at 3 (Nov. 2015).

2018]

THE ROLE OF GENDER DIVERSITY

111

there has been a focus on whether gender-diverse boards are more
successful.38 A growing interest in the effects of diversity in the boardroom
has generated a wide array of literature examining this topic.
A.

Correlation between Gender Diversity and Financial Measures

The existence of a correlation between female presence on boards and
performance of the firm has been documented by several studies, at least
among Fortune 500 companies. As noted above, one study found that a high
.,1.1,*O12 1R m14U2 12 p `1,*)2U Gbb W14.p2j:+ o1p,V O+ p++1WOp*UV mO*P
significantly higher return on sales and return on invested capital,39 and
another analysis similarly found that firms with diverse boards among the
Fortune 500 companies see nearly 2% greater ROA than firms with maleonly boards, with smaller but still significant premiums on ROA among
companies with diverse boards in India and the U.K. 40
Recent studies reported by the National Center for Women and
=UWP21L1Qj pL+1 POQPLOQP* *Pp* QU2VU, VO(U,+U *Up4+ “VU412+*,p*U +).U,O1,
productivity and financial performance compared with homogenous
*Up4+d”41 Additionally, a Credit Suisse report analyzed 2,360 firms in a
variety of different industries and found that companies with boards
comprising balanced representation of both genders outperformed
companies with single-sex boards.42 “_U2VU,-diverse management teams
showed superior return on equity, debt/equity ratios, price/equity ratios, and
p(U,pQU Q,1m*Pd”43 Because many of these benefits were evident after the
global economic crash in 2008, researchers suggest that gender diversity
might be particularly valuable in times surrounding a recession.44 The study
+)QQU+*+ *Pp* “QU2VU,-diverse executive boards decrease volatility and
38. Choudhury, supra note 7 (examining the literature and varous arguments for gender
diversity on boards).
39. N.M. Carter & H.M. Wagner, The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and
Women’s Representation on Boards 2004-2008, CATALYST, (Mar. 1, 2011), http
s://www.catalyst.org/system/files/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_and_women%2
7s_representation_on_boards_%282004-2008%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NCK-49BU].
40. Lagerberg, supra note 2.
41. Lecia Barker et al., What is the Impact of Gender Diversity on Technology Business
Performance? Research Summary, NAT:L CTR FOR WOMEN & INFO. TECH., at 2 (May 29,
2014), https://www.ncwit.org/sites/default/files/resources/impactgenderdiversitytechbusines
sperformanceprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWA5-WQG5].
42. Mary Curtis et al., Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance, at 3 (Aug. 2012),
CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachmen
ts/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_performance.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5T7-CCGR].
43. Barker et al., supra note 41, at 3.
44. Id.
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O2W,Up+U opLp2WU *P,1)QP1)* *PU UW1214OW WjWLUd” 45
Another McKinsey study selected 101 public, private, and nonprofit
companies, and discovered that having three or more women on boards led
to improved performance when compared to competitors. 46 The study
4Up+),UV .U,R1,4p2WU O2 *U,4+ 1Rf “rLqUpVU,+PO.f VO,UW*O12f pWW1)2*poOLO*jf
coordination and control, innovation, external orientation, capability, work
e2(O,124U2* p2V (pL)U+d” 47 Additionally, a particularly interesting field
experiment involved asking twelve member groups of student entrepreneurs
to start, sell shares of stock, and operate forty-three actual companies with
the goal of maximizing profit and shareholder value. 48 The study found
lower performance for male dominated teams, but noted that their “U+*O4p*U+
lack the precision to draw firm conclusions . . . when [the share of women]
UkWUUV+ bdFd” 49
Yet, another study showed after analysis of 272 projects at four firms,50
QU2VU, VO(U,+O*j 12 *UWP2OWpL m1,M *Up4+ ,U+)L*UV O2 “O2VO(OV)pL p2V
collective performance [being] . . d O2W,Up+UVd”51 Furthermore, a report from
the Peterson Institute for International Economics identifies the benefits of
having women in C-suite positions.52 This study of 21,980 publicly traded
companies in ninety-one countries demonstrates that the presence of more
female leaders in top positions of corporate management correlates with
increased profitability of approximately 6%. 53 It is important to note that
these studies present interesting correlations between gender and firm
performance. They do not, however, necessarily show causation. The next
Part considers causal factors.
B. Causal Relationship between Gender Diversity and Non-Financial

45. Id.
46. DESVAUX ET AL., MC KINSEY & COMPANY, WOMEN MATTER: GENDER DIVERSITY, A
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE DRIVER 12-14 (2007).
47. Id. at 12.
48. Sander Hoogendoorn, Hessel Oosterbeek & Mirjam van Praag, The Impact of Gender
Diversity on the Performance of Business Teams: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 59
MGMT. SCI. 1514 (2013).
49. Id. at 1524.
50. Laure Turner, Gender Diversity and Innovative Performance, 4 INT:L J. OF
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 123, 126 (2009).
51. Id. at 133.
52. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran, & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable?
Evidence from a Global Survey, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, (Feb.
2016), https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAQ7-HFVE].
53. Id. at 9.
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Indicators
Recent studies have suggested some novel causal mechanisms between
o1p,V VO(U,+O*j p2V RO,4 .U,R1,4p2WUd ]+OV,1:+ 0 >1o,pL:+ o,1pV +*)Vj 1R
European firms found that, although the presence of women on boards was
not directly associated with improved financial performance, gender
diversity was associated with greater compliance with ethical and social
standards, which the authors further suggest is tied to firm value indirectly. 54
A similar study examined the relationship between corporate social
responsibility (CSR) practices and female directors, finding that female
presence on boards has a causal effect on enhancing CSR due to both a
potentially different moral orientation with regard to firm operations and
personal reputational concerns.55 =PU p)*P1,+ Pj.1*PU+OiU *Pp* “4U2 p2V
women are different in their orientation toward moral principle, largely
because women have better internalized ethical and communal values
*P,1)QP *PUO, +1WOpL ,1LU+”56 and so would be more inclined to implement
CSR .1LOWOU+f 1, pL*U,2p*O(ULjf *Pp* “m14U2 O2VU.U2VU2* VO,UW*1,+ Wp2
establish or improve their reputational standing within an organization
through their expertise in CSR-,ULU(p2* O++)U+f” p2V +1 )+U !>?
implementation as a way to secure their reputation. 57
Similarly, a paper examining Malaysian firms found a correlation
between female board presence and company environmental reporting,
though no causal link was established. 58 Furthermore, a study of Australian
firms suggested a causal link between female board presence and internal
monitoring and firm-wide ethical conduct, arguing that women typically
Pp(U +*,12QU, “,ULp*O12pL poOLO*OU+” mPOWP .,141*U+ “+1WOpL ,U+.12+O(U2U++”
within the firm. 59 Improved monitoring, may in turn lead to better outcomes
for the fO,4 oj U2+),O2Q *Pp* “+Pp,UP1LVU, R)2V+ p,U 21* 4O+p..,1.,Op*UVf
,U+)L*O2Q O2 oU**U, UW1214OW .U,R1,4p2WUd”60

54. Isidro & Sobral, supra note 12, at 15.
55. Hyun et al., supra note 21, at 6.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Michelle Siew Huei Phua & Poh-Ling Ho, Female Directors of Corporate Boards:
Does Female Leadership Drive Corporate Environmental Transparency?, 34 SHS WEB OF
CONFERENCES (2017) https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2017/02/shsconf
four2017_05002.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3W9-FVAB].
59. Galbreath, supra note 27, at 17.
60. Id. at 30.
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C. Human Capital Differentials between Men and Women
Another stream of research has examined the effects of human capital
differentials among male and female directors. One study found that women
board members were more likely to fill skill or expertise gaps in boards
compared to their male counterparts and that the introduction of female
directors increases the heterogeneity of expertise and experience on a board,
thus allowing it to make better informed decisions. 61 These heterogeneity
effects independent of gender have been confirmed by past research. 62
Further, another study suggests that female directors attend board meetings
more often and engage in a range of similar minor behaviors that, overall,
4pj 4pMU *PU4 41,U “W14.U*U2*” VO,UW*1,+d 63 Yet, other researchers
conclude that gender is merely an intermediary factor between diversity of
experience and firm performance. 64
In addition, there may be compounding effects at play. One paper
examining female presence on Norwegian company boards found that the
perceived influence of individual female directors increased as the total
proportion of women on the board increased.65 Notably, this study found
that female board members generally felt that they had a fair amount of
influence on company decisions, mollifying concerns from some quarters
that the introduction of female board members is more a token or political
effort than anything else. 66 Whether this Norwegian conclusion applies to
the rest of the world is an open question. It should be further mentioned that
another recent study found no effect on Norwegian firm performance as a
result of female board inclusion, although capital accumulation did
increase.67
Several studies discussed above, such as the study of Australian firms,
have noted that improved firm performance of gender-diverse boards may
have more to do with the tendency of female directors to be more skilled or

61. Kim & Starks, supra note 18, at 268-69.
62. Milliken & Martins, supra note 16 (Noting that heterogeneity effects have been
associated with diversity in age, ethnic and racial background, experience, occupational
background and other categories).
63. R.B. Adams & D. Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. OF FIN. ECON. 291 (2009).
64. Kim & Starks, supra note 18, at 270.
65. Beate Elstad & Gro Ladegard, Women on Corporate Boards: Key Influences or
Tokens?, 16 MANAG. GOV. 595 (2012).
66. Id. at 610.
67. Harald Dale-Olsen, Pål Schone, & Mette Verner, Diversity among Norwegian Boards
of Directors: Does a Quota for Women Improve Firm Performance?, 19 FEMINIST ECON.,
110 ( 2013).
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otherwise better qualified than their male counterparts. This begs the
question, however: why do female directors have, for example, more skills
than their male counterparts? Or to put it another way: why must women be
more skilled than men before they are placed on boards? Professor Hyun
and her colleagues surmise that reputational concerns may more strongly
influence the behavior of women board members. 68 Research has shown that
women are often stereotypically perceived as poorly suited for leadership
positions for emotional reasons by both male and female peers. 69 Notably,
role incongruity and related theories suggest that because leadership is still
widely perceived, consciously or subconsciously, as a role not suitable for
women, women leaders are evaluated more negatively under a variety of
circumstances compared to otherwise identical male counterparts, and
therefore, hampered in their advancement to leadership roles like board
membership.70 As noted earlier, Hyun et al. find that female directors likely
engage in CSR promotion to solidify their reputations as competent members
of the board,71 a conclusion corroborated by evidence that women generally
have more difficulty establishing credibility in technical areas.72
D. Reputational Effect of Gender Diversity on Boards
Some studies conclude that the presence of women on boards may have
positive reputational effects for firms, particularly those that interact directly
with consumer sectors. 73 This suggests that firms may accumulate benefits
from having female board members completely independent of their skills
and qualifications: merely their presence may be enough to improve
performance in some way. 74 Researchers studying Spanish firms have
proposed that media attention surrounding the mere nomination of female
directors may act as a positive signaling mechanism for firms to their
stakeholders, though the evidence on this point is inconclusive within the
Spanish sample examined. 75 Another study also looking at Spanish firms
68. Hyun et.al., supra note 21, at 6.
69. Victoria L. Brescoll, Leading with their hearts? How Gender Stereotypes of Emotion
Lead to Biased Evaluations of Female Leaders, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 415 (2016).
70. Id.
71. Hyun et al., supra note 21, at 6.
72. A.C. Rusaw, Achieving Credibility: An Analysis of Women’s Experience, 16 REV. OF
PUB. PERSONNEL. ADMIN. 19, 22 (1996).
73. S. Brammer, A. Millington, & S. Pavelin, Corporate Reputation and Women on the
Board, 20 BRIT. J. OF MGMT. 17-29 (2008).
74. Milliken & Martins, supra note 16, at 416.
75. Celia de Anca & Patricia Gabaldon, The Media Impact of Board Member
Appointments in Spanish-Listed Companies: A Gender Perspective, 122 J.OF BUS. ETHICS
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found a positive association between firm reputation ranking and the
presence of female, as well as independent, directors, although causality was
not definitively established. 76 Overall, there is some evidence that the mere
presence of female board members may have positive effects on firm
reputation and ensuing potential positive effects on firm performance.
II.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: ROLE
INCONGRUITY

The comprehensive annual report written by McKinsey & Company
and Lean In in 2017 (2017 Report) found an increasing number of companies
are committing to gender equality. 77 Major firms like Apple, IBM and CVS
have also faced major pressure from shareholders in the form of investor
proposals to adopt policies promoting gender equality within their firms. 78
Additionally, investor-driven proposals for gender diversity have seen mixed
success: these proposals put forth at major corporations in 2016 saw only
25% support among voting shares, on average. 79 Companies, therefore, seem
to be struggling with implementing gender equality policies.
A. Gender Disadvantages Identified by McKinsey & Company and
Lean In
Looking at the corporate pipeline, it is evident that inequality begins at
the very first promotion and continues to increase at each subsequent step. 80
On average, the 2017 Report finds that women are hired and promoted at
lower rates compared to men, and at senior levels women shift to staff roles
rather than continuing the path to becoming CEO. 81 Because a vast majority
of CEOs come from line roles, tPO+ +POR* V,p4p*OWpLLj O2RL)U2WU+ m14U2:+
odds of reaching C-suite positions negatively.
Women also feel disadvantaged in their daily interactions with other
colleagues and managers in the workplace. The 2017 Report indicates that
425 (2013).
76. Francisco Bravo, Cristina Abad, & Joaquina L Briones, The Board of Directors and
Corporate Reputation: An Empirical Analysis, 28 ACADEMIA R EVISTA L ATINOAMERICANA
DE A DMINISTRACIÓN 79 (2015).
77. McKinsey & Co. & Lean In, Women in the Workplace Report, (2017), https://wome
nintheworkplace.com/ [https://perma.cc/B6ZR-CUF8].
78. Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, People
of Color, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 2, 2017).
79. McKinsey & Co. & Lean In, Women in the Workplace Report, (2017), supra note 77.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 4.
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women do not experience an even playing field because they do not believe
their contributions are appropriately valued; they are unable to meaningfully
participate in meetings; they do not feel they are receiving challenging
assignments; and they are not turned to for input on important decisions.82
B. Reasons for the Under-Representation of Women in Corporate
Governance
The 2017 Report also highlights that women are 15% less likely to get
promoted then are men.83 At this rate, it will take more than a century to
achieve gender parity in the C-suite.84 Not being given the same
opportunities for both promotions and moving up in a firm creates frustration
and lack of motivation for women to excel in a work environment.
In 2015, Lean In and McKinsey & Company issued a report (2015
Report) and similarly found that fewer women compared to men were aiming
for top positions.85 Women cited pressure as one of their primary reasons for
not wanting to hold a top position.86 The 2015 Report also highlights the
misconception that women with children are less ambitious to reach top level
positions in a firm.87 This is because, according to the survey, mothers were
15% more interested in being a top executive as compared to women without
children.88 Furthermore, the research found that, “[m]ore than 90% of
women and men believe taking extended family leave will hurt their position
at work.”89 This creates a barrier for women as they tend to feel the pressure
for a work life balance, making them less likely to be considered for a
promotion opportunity.
A study conducted by Korn Ferry tracked board composition in the
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4.
85. McKinsey & Co. & Lean In, Women in the WorkPlace 2015, available at
https://womenintheworkplace.com/2015 [https://perma.cc/F6A4-MDK5], at 11); see also
Shana Lebowitz, A New Study from Lean In and McKinsey Finds Exactly How Much More
Men are Likely to get Promoted than Women, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Oct. 1, 2015, 1:40 P.M.),
https://www.businessinsider.com/women-are-less-likely-to-get-promoted-2015-10 [https://p
erma.cc/G4GN-462H]
86. McKinsey & Co. & Lean In, Women in the WorkPlace 2015, supra note 85, at 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 16.
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largest 100 publicly listed companies in ten Asia Pacific economies and
found that when it comes to executive leadership, Asia is ahead of some of
the western developed nations. 90 =PU 2)4oU,+ +P1m *Pp*f “r*qhe proportion
of women in senior management was much greater in China (38%) and
Indonesia (41%) as well as Southeast Asia, than in the US (22%) and
European markets likU *PU ;[ hJb3g p2V _U,4p2j hKH3gd”91 This suggests
that there is an increasing female executive presence in Asia. Possible
reasons may include: in-built childcare, rapid economic growth of the private
sector, and firms identifying and rewarding strong performers regardless of
gender. All these factors contribute to a good work-life balance for women,
allowing them to excel at work while maintaining a healthy household. 92
In addition, another researcher conducted twenty-seven one-on-one indepth interviews with women in the financial services industry. 93 Sixtythree percent of women in this study discussed leaving a senior role, of which
82% were in investment banking. 94 The main reasons given by the women
for leaving were frustration, change and choice. 95 Their frustration stemmed
from the finance firm culture, such as long hours and the need to be seen,
thus limiting a work-life balance and the ability to work flexible hours. 96
This may cause frustration particularly for women with families.
Additionally, a largely male workforce creates a masculine culture, and the
“o1j+ WL)o” 4U2*pLO*j W,Up*U+ p P141QU21)+ m1,MR1,WUd 97 Also, given the
high competitiveness of the finance industry, women could only experience
considerable opportunities if they played politics.98 Moreover they found
that issues such as balancing work and family responsibilities and bias
against women in the workplace causes women to become further frustrated
with their job. 99
=P)+f pWW1,VO2Q *1 *PU +*)Vjf O* p..Up,+ *Pp* m14U2:+ R,)+*,p*O12+ mith
90. KORN FERRY INSTITUTE, THE D IVERSITY SCORECARD 2016: BUILDING DIVERSITY IN
ASIA PACIFIC BOARDROOMS (April 18, 2016), https://www.kornferry.com/institute/korn-ferrydiversity-scorecard-2016-building-diversity-in-asia-pacific-boardrooms; Aimee Hansen,
Spotlight on Asia: Gender Diversity is Both Catching up and Leading, THE GLASSHAMMER,
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018) http://theglasshammer.com/2016/08/11/spotlight-asia-genderdiversity-catching-leading/ [https://perma.cc/9RYW-SX6V].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Carolyn Neck, Disappearing women: why do women leave senior roles in finance?,
40(3) AUSTRALIAN. J. OF MGMT. 488, 494 (2015).
94. Id. at 494.
95. Id. at 496.
96. Id. at 496.
97. Id. at 498.
98. Id. at 499.
99. Id. at 501.
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the culture and lifestyle of the financial services industry limits their
willingness to take a more senior position at a financial institution. Of the
fourteen women leaving investment banking in this study, only 29%, or four
women, moved to a senior role in banking. 100 “=PUj R1)2V p**,pW*O(U
opportunities that addressed their work frustrations (such as better hours,
more flexibility and management support) and fulfilled their desire for
WPp2QU h2Um L1Wp*O12 1, p 2Um 1..1,*)2O*jgd” 101 The women who left
investment banking continued to work outside the financial services
industry.102
A study involving hiring at Hewlett-Packard revealed an interesting
W12WU.*B “[m]en apply for a job when they meet only 60% of the
qualifications, but women apply only if they 4UU* Kbb3 1R *PU4d”103 Tara
Sophia Mohr surveyed over 1,000 females p2V 4pLU+ p+MO2Q *PU4f “rOqR j1)
VUWOVUV 21* *1 p..Lj R1, p N1o oUWp)+U j1) VOV2:* 4UU* pLL *PU -)pLOROWp*O12+f
mPj VOV2:* j1) p..Lj#” 104 A majority of the respondents said they did not
apply for the job because they thought they were not qualified. Furthermore,
Jb3 1R m14U2 VOV 21* p..Lj oUWp)+U *PUj RUp,UV RpOL),Uf +)QQU+*O2Q *Pp* “we
2UUV *1 Uk.p2V *PU o),QU12O2Q W12(U,+p*O12 po1)* m14U2:+ ,ULp*O12+PO.
with failure, and explore how bias, stereotype threat, the dearth of women
LUpVU,+f p2V QO,L+: Q,Up*U, +)WWU++ O2 +WP11L pLL 4pj W12*,Oo)*U *1 1), Q,Up*U,
p(1OVp2WU 1R RpOL),Ud”105
Twice as many women as men in this study also noted that they did not
apply for a job because they were following the guidelines of applicant
,U-)O,U4U2*+f +)QQU+*O2Q *Pp* m14U2 p,Uf “+1WOpLOiUV *1 R1LL1m *PU ,)LU+d” 106
]* p..Up,+ *Pp* m14U2 *U2V *1 +UU *PU ,UW,)O*O2Q .,1WU++ 1R p+ 41,U “oj-theo11M” 107 than men. Thus, we see that social misconceptions, lack of access
to needed services, work mentality, and gender bias are some of the key
reasons restricting women from top executive positions at firms.
C. Challenges of Gender Diversity in the Work Environment
Diversifying the work environment involves several challenges.
100. Id. at 506.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 507.
103. Tara Sophia Mohr, Why Women Don’t Apply to Jobs Unless They’re 100%
Qualified?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 25, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/why-women-dontapply-for-jobs-unless-theyre-100-qualified [https://perma.cc/J8M9-JVJZ].
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Professor Peterson conducted a study for a health education company
LLumari, Inc.108 =PU +*)Vj:+ 1oNUW*O(U mp+ *1 +UU mPp* 4U2 p2V m14U2
value in workplace, how each gender defines a healthy work environment
and what impacts their health and stress.109 The study was conducted using
an online questionnaire using specific stimulus including words and phrases
with which participants could relate and each response was given a weighted
score. A total of 1123 individuals participated, 608 males and 515
females.110
The results reveal that although men and women value the same aspects
of work, they ordered and prioritized them differently. 111 `1, Ukp4.LUf “4U2
valued pay, money, and benefits, as well as power, authority, and status
significantly more than wo4U2 VOVf”112 while women valued, different
p+.UW*+ *Pp* W1)LV oU 1o*pO2UV O2 *PU m1,M.LpWUf O2WL)VO2Q “R,OU2V+ p2V
relationships . . . recognition and respect . . . communication . . . fairness and
equity . . . teams and collaboration . . d Rp4OLj p2V P14Ud”113 Furthermore,
*PU ,U+)L*+ +P1m *Pp* *PU 4U2 +),(UjUV *U2V *1 oU )2pmp,U 1R m14U2:+ m1,Mrelated issues while women overestimate the extent to which men value
authority, pay and money. 114 Women also reported being more stressed at
work as compared to men. 115 Thus, we see that the differences in opinions,
priorities, and values create further conflict in the workplace.
In addition, researchers at New York University have evaluated how in
the contemporary workplace, where work takes place in teams and it is
diRROW)L* *1 UkpW*Lj VU*U,4O2U p2 O2VO(OV)pL:+ W12*,Oo)*O12 *1 *PU +)WWU++ 1R
the team, women frequently get less credit in subjective evaluations. 116 The
authors ran three separate studies to determine how the genders were
evaluated when working within mixed-gender teams, manipulating how
information about those being evaluated was presented. 117 They found that
across the board, otherwise identical female team members were consistently
U(pL)p*UV 41,U .11,Ljf p2V “*P1)QP* *1 oU QU2U,pLLj LU++ W14.U*U2*f LU++
influential in arriving at the successful team outcome, and less apt to have
*pMU2 12 p LUpVU,+PO. ,1LU O2 *PU *p+M *Pp2 mU,U *PUO, 4pLU W1)2*U,.p,*+d” 118
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Peterson, supra note 26, at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Heilman & Haynes, supra note 24, at 905.
Id.
Id. at 914.
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Providing those performing evaluations with objective measures of
individual performance, however, helped alleviate this difference. 119
Finally, Professor Deborah Tannen discusses how voice and confidence
plays a role in a work environment. 120 In a referenced study, 121 each senior
manager reviewed individuals in his group and evaluated them for
promotion. No female was selected because the managers believed that none
of the women had the self-confidence needed to be promoted.122
Furthermore, the studies appear to show that the managers selected people
for promotion by their own linguistic norms. 123 Women, however, may have
different styles of speaking and conveying their opinions than men, which
appears to disadvantage them when males are making promotion
decisions.124
In general, Tannen describes men to be sensitive to the power dynamics
as they often speak in ways that position themselves as one up and resisting
being put in a one-down position by others. 125 On the other hand, women
tend to speak in ways which save face for others and avoid statements seen
as putting another person down, which can be seen as lacking self-confidence
or assurance by employers. 126 714U2 pL+1 *U2V *1 ,URU, *1 “mU” O2 +O*)p*O12+
mPU,U 4U2 ,URU, *1 “]f” mPOWP Wp2 O2RL)U2WU mPOWP .p,*OW)Lp, .p,*j QU*+ W,UVO*
for a certain activity. 127 “A2U m14p2 Uk.LpO2UV *Pp* O* m1)LV +1)2V *11 +ULRpromoting *1 WLpO4 W,UVO* O2 p2 1o(O1)+ mpj oj +pjO2Qf <] VOV *PO+d: sU* +PU
expectedTsometimes vainlyTthat others would know it was her work and
m1)LV QO(U PU, *PU W,UVO* +PU VOV 21* WLpO4 R1, PU,+ULRd” 128 This further
suggests that women may tend to downplay their certainty while men may
tend to downplay their doubts, making them come across as more confident
and self-aware.
An interesting point highlighted by Tannen is the use of the word
“+1,,j” oj m14U2 p2V 4U2d 129 This is because many men avoid apologies
as they see them as putting themselves in a lower position. 130 Women use
119. Id.
120. Deborah Tannen, The Power of Talk: Who Gets Heard and Why?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept.-Oct., 1995), https://hbr.org/1995/09/the-power-of-talk-who-gets-heard-and-why [https
://perma.cc/6ED4-YM8K].
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id.
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*PU m1,V “+1,,j” 41,U R,U-)U2*Lj p2V )+U O* *1 Uk.,U++ W12WU,2d 131 This
difference was voiced when some of the employees Tannen interviewed said
that they dislike working with people who do not admit to their own
mistakes.132
III.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT

Another reason for the perceived role incongruity of women as leaders
can, at many companies, be attributed to sexual harassment. This is
especially true in some areas where there is a male-dominant culture in
professions such as entertainment, politics, and law. 133 Sexual harassment is
an abuse of power by those in positions of power over the job 134 and results
when women are seen more as sex objects rather than for their competence
and skills in the job. When there is harassment, most women just leave the
harassing conditions and move on to another job rather than report it or deal
with it directly. According to one study, only one quarter to one third of
people experiencing harassment report it to a supervisor or union
representative, and only 2% to 13% file a formal complaint. 135 The result of
this pattern is that women must reestablish themselves at a new workplace
and rebuild credibility. This in turn results in women being behind men in
terms of experience, good recommendations, salary, and the ability to time
their departures under conditions that benefit them. Additionally, the failure
to report is seen by some as evidence that harassment did not happen or was
not serious enough to worry about, thus the harmful behavior goes
uncorrected. 136
Over the decades since the courts first recognized the right to seek relief
for sexual harassment in the 1970s, 137 there have been surges in interest and
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Aarti Rawaswami et al., The Interactive Effects of Gender and Mentoring on Career
Attainment: Making the Case for Female Lawyers, 37 J. OF CAREER DEV. 692, 694 (Jan.
2010).
134. Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the Systems That Enable Men Like Harvey
Weinstein, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-power-and-thesystems-that-enable-men-like-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3K5P-AHGL].
135. Claire Cain Miller, Not Just Fox: Why Women Don’t Report Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2017, at B2 (citing a meta-analysis of studies by Professors Lilia Cortina
and Jennifer Berdahl).
136. Id.
137. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom.; Williams v. Bell, 587 F. 2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elect. &
Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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lawsuits about harassment.138 Sexual harassment has traditionally been
viewed as a form of sex discrimination covered by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 139 Sexual harassment is seen as an abuse of power
because of the traditional inequality of power between men and women in
+1WOU*jf 4pQ2OROUV O2 U4.L1j4U2* oUWp)+U 1R p2 U4.L1jU,:+ .1mU, 1(U, *PU
employee and a typically male-dominated work environment. 140 A (male)
employer or supervisor abuses his power when he subjects an employee over
whom he has power to unwelcome conduct. He uses his economic power to
coerce the employee to engage in conduct that the employee feels forced to
accept. This is known as quid pro quo sexual harassment because
submission to the power is exchanged for a job benefit. 141 If sufficiently
severe, one act of harassment is sufficient to state a claim. The lack of an
objection from the employee does not mean that the behavior is welcome;
she may feel she has no power to object. 142 As noted above, because most
women just leave, this comports with actual behavior. In Title VII suits, the
claim is against the employer. 143 The employee can also sue the harasser
under tort and other theories if the facts fit the requirements.144
The ability of an employee to seek redress under Title VII was greatly
expanded when the Supreme Court adopted the theory of hostile
environment.145 Under this theory, the employer abuses its power when it

138. Jessica Campbell, The First Woman Who Alleged ‘Sexual Harassment, LEGACY.COM
(2017), http://www.legacy.com/news/culture-and-trends/article/the-first-brave-woman-whoalleged-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/95LV-YKR5]. The term “sexual harassment”
was first used by three female Cornell University professors. FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL:
WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW, 218-25 (1st ed., 2009). It was first used in the media in a
1975 article. Enid Nemy, Women Begin to Speak Out Against Sexual Harassment at Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1975, at 38.
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
140. See Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1984); Terry Morehead Dworkin, et al., Theories of Recovery for
Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 127 (1988) (showing
the relationship between sexual harassment claims and Title VII).
141. The threat can either be explicit or implicit. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2018).
142. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF
SEX: ONE L AW, TEN C ASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT C HANGED AMERICAN WOMEN:S LIVES AT
WORK 83 (2016) (showing how Vinson, a bank employee, was subjected to groping, lewd
comments, and sexual assault from her boss, including intercourse over 40 to 50 times; she
submitted to the behavior because she needed the job and her boss threatened to kill her if she
was not “perfectly cooperative”).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012). The employer is vicariously liable for the
harassment even though it did not participate or condone the behavior.
144. Dworkin et al., supra note 140.
145. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); CATHERINE MAC KINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, 44 (1979).
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creates or tolerates a harassing environment created by co-employees, a
supervisor, or even a customer. 146 In general, it differs from quid pro quo
harassment in that no job benefits are on the line, and because several
incidents are required to create a harassing environment.147 A hostile
environment is created when the behavior has the effect or purpose of
)2,Up+12poLj O2*U,RU,O2Q mO*P *PU (OW*O4:+ m1,Mf 1, O+ 1RRU2+O(U 1,
intimidating enough to do so. 148 The employer is liable if it knew or should
have known about the harassment and it did not take swift and or appropriate
remedial action. 149 The employer can also be held liable under a theory of
constructive firing if the victim quits rather than tolerate the behavior. 150
Under a theory of harassing environment, the employer can escape
liability if the employer can show that he or she exercised reasonable care to
prevent harassment or appropriately dealt with the harassing environment.
If the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities
provided by the employer to prevent or correct the behavior, then the
employer will not be liable. 151 This protection from liability for this class of
harassment led most large employers to set up programs to prevent
harassment. If employers explain what harassment is, train employees,
create clear reporting procedures, 152 adequately investigate reports, and take
appropriate action if the report is verified, they can escape liability.
146. ANNE C. LEVY & MICHELE A. P ALUDI, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 21 (2d ed.,
2001). The employer can also be liable if the harassment is male-on-male, not just one gender
versus another. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
147. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
148. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (2016).
Whether the behavior is sufficient to create a hostile environment is judged by a reasonable
person, reasonable victim, or reasonable woman standardTwould the reasonable person,
considering all the circumstances, find it abusive. Even if it does not seriously affect the
employee:s psychological wellbeing, if it “detract[s] from the employee[<]s job performance,
discourage[s] employees from remaining on the job, or keep[s] them from advancing in their
careers” it is sufficient. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (holding that between the two, courts look
at the circumstances from the perspective of a female rather than the gender-neutral
reasonable person standard); see also, Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959,
963 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that unwelcome sexual advances supported a claim of sexual
harassment).
149. MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 300 (5th ed., 1994).
150. Id. This is known as constructive firing. To be successful, the victim must show that
the conditions were sufficiently intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to
quit.
151. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 743 (1998).
152. The procedure must include an alternative place to report in case the procedures
require the employee to report to the harasser. Sexual Harassment Policy and Complaint/
Investigation Procedure, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (May 24, 2018), htt
ps://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/pages/cms_000554.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4Z8W-Z8MY].
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After each of these important decisions, attention to workplace
harassment rose, as did lawsuits alleging harassment. Another significant
spur for attention and suits was the Senate hearings about the appointment
of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court in 1991. 153 Thomas was accused
of harassment by his former employee, Anita Hill; nonetheless, he was
confirmed.154 The publicity surrounding the hearings, however, made
women more aware of their rights and protections and lawsuits ensued.
Employer efforts to try to prevent workplace harassment also greatly
increased. Over time, however, the programs became less about changing
the workplace culture and more focused on preventing liability. 155
At present, there is another surge in attention focusing on sexual
harassment. What is different about the current surge is that it is happening
largely outside the legal system and, in several cases, allegations alone have
caused powerful people to lose their jobs and their reputations. As in the
Thomas hearings, the current surge was kicked off by focusing on a powerful
individual, in this case a man in the entertainment industry, Harvey
7UO2+*UO2f 12U 1R ^1LLjm11V:+ 41+* .,14O2U2* .,1V)WU,+d A,*OWLU+ O2 *PU
New York Times and the New Yorker in 2017 revealed information about
Weinstein and his almost forty years of sexual harassment (and worse). 156
=PU RpLL1)*f “[t]he newest uprising of the women on behalf of the right to be
treated with the civility and respect due any citizen . . d f”157 termed by some
p+ *PU “7UO2+*UO2 aRRUW*f” 158 is having an ever-broadening impact. Once
153. In a twist of fate, Anita Hill, currently a professor at Brandeis University, has now
been tapped to lead the Commission on Sexual Harassment and Advancing Equality in the
Workplace. The Commission, formed in December, 2017, is designed to combat inequality
and harassment in the entertainment industry. Ellen McCarthy, Anita Hill chosen to lead
Hollywood sexual harassment commission, WASH. POST (Dec.16, 2017), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/12/16/anita-hill-chosen-to-leadhollywood-sexual-harassment-commission [https://perma.cc/UJ47-XSNB].
154. Former Vice President Joe Biden said he now regrets the way Hill was treated by the
Senate Judiciary Committee during the hearings in 1991. Id.
155. Miller, supra note 135.
156. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Sexual Misconduct Claims Trail a Hollywood Mogul,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2017, at A1; Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Army of Spies, The NEW
YORKER : NEWS DESK, (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harveyweinsteins-army-of-spies [https://perma.cc/86TS-JS6E]; Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s
Secret Settlements, THE NEW YORKER : NEWS DESK, (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.newyorker
.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc/8WVK-AMP
P]; see also Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., (Mar.Apr., 1994) (finding that executives who ignore ethics increase the risk of personal and
corporate liability).
157. Vivian Gornick, They Were True Believers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 17, 2017,
at SR9.
158. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Sexual Misconduct Rocks Media, Politics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
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7UO2+*UO2:+ po)+U 1R .1mU, p2V PO+ VUWpVU+-long cover-ups became known,
it sparked a national conversation that led to the forced resignation or firing
of many men in positions of power and leadership. Among these are
directors (including Weinstein), 159 media personalities,160 judges or judicial
candidates,161 CEOs,162 and legislators.163 In this respect it is much broader
*Pp2 p2 U4.L1jU,:+ LOpoOLO*j R1, +Uk)pL Pp,p++4U2*d
The current movement is different in important respects from earlier
ones in that it has been greatly facilitated by social media. Women now feel
much more empowered to speak out through groups such as #MeToo and
#TimesUp.164 “X1m *PU (OW*O4+ p,U 12 *PU 1RRU2+O(Uf p2V *PU pWW)+UV p,U 12
*PU VURU2+O(Ud” 165 Although many of the claims would not rise to successful
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/natural-disasters-shootings-and-harassment-claims-1513
108128 [https://perma.cc/7FDK-5L9P].
159. Weinstein was forced to leave the company he founded, and it has recently been sold
to a group led by Maria Contreras-Sweet. Ben Fritz, Group Agrees to Buy Weinstein Assets,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2018, at B6.
160. Braden Campbell, Matt Lauer Canned by NBC After Sexual Misconduct Report, LAW
360 (Nov. 29, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/989278/matt-lauer-canned
-by-nbc-after-sexual-misconduct-report [https://perma.cc/G3AK-H8KG].
161. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Sexual-Harassment Probe of Judge Set, WALL ST. J., Dec.
16-17, 2017, at A2 (reporting investigations of Judge Alex Kozinski following sexual
harassment allegations from former law clerks); Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski
Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html
[https://perma.cc/2GAN-ML7X] (reporting that Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski had been
accused of groping women, including a law student, among other allegations, and that he
subsequently retired).
162. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Visa Fired Executive after Tip in Email, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2017, at B1.
163. See, e.g., Brendan Farrington, Florida senator resigns amid sexual misconduct
allegation, THE SEATTLE TIMES : N ATION & WORLD (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.
seattletimes.com/nation-world/florida-governor-senator-should-step-down-over-allegations/
[https://perma.cc/28UU-VDC3] (reporting resignations of government officials following
investigations finding credible evidence of sexual misconduct); The Associated Press, Nevada
Democrat, Facing Ethics Probe, Won’t Seek Re-election, THE SEATTLE TIMES: NATION &
WORLD (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nevada-democratfacing-ethics-probe-wont-seek-re-election/ [https://perma.cc/3N4C-EJKQ] (reporting a U.S.
Representative:s announcement not to seek re-election following sexual harassment
allegations). Although almost all incidents have involved men harassing women, a few
females have also been accused.
164. A USA Today survey reported that 94% of women in the entertainment industry said
they had experienced some form of sexual harassment or assault in their careers. Maria Puente
& Cara Kelly, How Bad Is Hollywood’s “Me Too” Problem?, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2018, at
A1. Only one of four women reported the incident for fear of personal or professional
backlash. Id. at 2A.
165. Alexandra Wolfe, Gloria Allred: The Controversial Attorney Talks About Her Long
Career and Defends Her Often Criticized Tactics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17-18, 2018, at C11.
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sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the women are being listened to
and actions are being taken. These actions, while benefitting people in a
variety of ways, also mean that boards and companies need to change their
thinking and actions around diversity and equal treatment.
The Weinstein Effect has proved beneficial for women in ways other
than simply a forum and empowerment to speak up. In several cases it had
the secondary effect of some women being promoted to positions in the Csuite as men have been forced to resign or have been fired because of their
abuse of power.166 These include Jennifer Salke, the new head of Amazon
Studios, who replaced Roy Price who left after allegations of harassment. 167
This development could be called the glass elevator.
In some ways, this devel1.4U2* O+ +O4OLp, *1 *PU “QLp++ WLORR” URRUW*
where boards have put a woman in a leadership position only after there is a
crisis that the male leaders have been unable to solve. 168 Named after the
glass ceiling,169 it is called a cliff because the company is in a very tenuous
position and failure is difficult to overcome. 170 If the female leader fails, or
falls off the cliff, gender is blamed for part of the failure and cited as a reason
why women do not belong in such positions. 171 The women filling vacancies
166. See, e.g., 2017 Whistleblower of the Year Nominee-The Weinstein Whistleblowers,
CONSTANTINE CANNON WHISTLEBLOWER INSIDE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2017), https://constantineca
nnon.com/2017/12/22/2017-whistleblower-year-nominee-weinstein-whistleblowers/
[https://perma.cc/8TE2-KW5U] (describing how the Weinstein whistleblowers encouraged
other women to report prominent men engaging in sexual harassment). As of December 22,
2016, over ninety women have accused Weinstein of rape, sexual assault, and sexual
harassment. Id.
167. Joe Flint, NBC Taps New Co-Anchor for ‘Today’, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2018, at B4
(describing a woman:s successful replacement of a male who was fired for sexual
misconduct).
168. See DG McCullough, Women CEOs: Why Companies in Crisis Hire Minorities&and
Then Fire Them, THE GUARDIAN: SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS (Aug. 8, 2014, 2:42 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/aug/05/fortune-500-companiescrisis-woman-ceo-yahoo-xerox-jc-penny-economy
[https://perma.cc/8SEB-HTUD]
(explaining the glass cliff theory); Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff:
Exploring the Dynamics Surrounding the Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership
Positions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 549 (2007) (expanding further on the glass cliff theory).
169. The term “glass cliff” was coined by Exeter University Professors Ryan and Haslam.
Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dynamics
Surrounding the Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 549 (2007).
170. Katrin Benhold, Female Leaders May Face ‘Glass Cliff,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2016,
at A3. Bennhold claimed that the same effect occurs in politics as in companies. She
highlighted that after the appointment of Theresa May as prime minister after Brexit, “[a]ll
the men who were responsible for the mess stabbed each other soundly in the back and then
ran away.” Id.
171. McCullough, supra note 168 (citing a study by Utah State University professors).
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caused by sexual harassment, though, are starting in a better position to be
successful. The company probably is not in a precarious position, and there
may be some thought that because she is female, the harassment issue is
solved. Some of the new female leaders are likely to be questioned because
of the way they were put in the job, however. 172
The harassment scandals have also led to changes in how boards search
for and screen CEO candidates. 173 They are doing more careful screening of
candidates particularly in relation to sexual harassment, because,
“r,qU.)*p*O12 4p2pQU4U2* O+ oUW14O2Q p2 O2W,Up+O2QLj O4.1,*p2* W14.12U2*
1R *PU (pL)p*O12 1R p o)+O2U++d” 174 This stress on reputation is shown by the
forcing out of powerful leaders after allegations of harassment.175 It is
anticipated that undisclosed sexual harassment in a prior job can later give
grounds for firing for cause and diminish the reputation of the
organization.176 Although boards have often done background and reference
checks, and even psychological evaluations before choosing a CEO, these
evaluations often miss lawsuits alleging workplace sexual harassment. 177
Social media, which is easily searchable, can help in the screening. Perhaps
41+* 21*poLjf *PU “6YU =11” 41(U4U2* mPU,U .U1.LU +Pp,U *PUO,
experiences of sexual harassment, has played an important role in bringing
incidents to light. Continued attention paid by the media, including the
Golden Globe Awards 178 and articles in widely seen publications such as

172. Id. Another downside is that a female CEO is more likely to be replaced by a male
CEO. In addition, the terms of female CEOs are more likely to be shorter and therefore they
have less time to prove themselves.
173. Joann S. Lublin, Scandals Reshape CEO Searches, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2017, at
B6.
174. Id. (quoting the chief executive of Allergan and a director of Cisco Systems Inc.).
175. See Cannon, supra note 166.
176. Senator Al Franken was forced to resign after allegations and photos showed him
kissing women without their consent. These incidents occurred before he was elected to the
Senate. See Heather Caygle, Another Woman Says Franken Tried to Forcibly Kiss Her,
POLITICO, Dec. 6, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/06/al-franken-accusationsexual-harassment-2006-281049 [https://perma.cc/4D4S-LB4F] (reporting the allegations
that Al Franken tried to forcibly kiss a former staffer, saying that he was entitled to do so as
an entertainer).
177. Lublin, supra note 173.
178. See Erich Schwartzel, Causes Outshine Celebrities at Golden Globes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 8, 2018, at A11 (“At the 75th Golden Globe Awards . . . the entertainment industry:s
reckoning over sexual harassment across Hollywood upstaged every category and
celebrity.”). The article predicted the presentation of the Oscars at the Academy Awards
ceremony would likely have the same influence. Some of the stars have formed an
organization called Time:s Up to help women who have been harassed.
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New York Times Magazine179 and Time Magazine180 have also made it easier
for women to speak up.
Boards have another cause for concern – their own liability. One
example is the experience of the board of Wynn Resorts Ltd. After Steve
7j22f *PU “MO2Q 1R Zp+ 8UQp+f”181 left his position as top executive of the
casino empire he founded because of multiple allegations of harassment,
regulators began to look into whether board members and other executives
knew about a $7.5 million settlement Wynn allegedly paid to a manicurist
who alleged Wynn forced her to have sex with him, and whether they failed
to report it.182 XU(pVp:+ Qp4oLO2Q ,UQ)Lp*1,+ Pp(U +U* ). p ,U.1,*O2Q +j+*U4
for tips and complaints about Wynn, and regulators in Massachusetts and
XU(pVp p,U W12+OVU,O2Q mPU*PU, *PU W14.p2j:+ Qp4oLO2Q LOWU2+U+ +P1)LV oU
pulled.183 =PU,U Pp(U oUU2 WpLL+ R1, *PU o1p,V:+ ,U+OQ2p*O12 p2V +14U WpLL+
for liability on their part for their failure of corporate governance. 184 Stock
prices plunged after the publicity about the alleged decades-long pattern of
misconduct.185
Another example involves Fox News. A shareholder, the City of
Y12,1U a4.L1jUU+: ?U*O,U4U2* >j+*U4 h?U*O,U4U2* >j+*U4gf ROLUV p
derivative complaint against 21st Century Fox and its board alleging that the
o1p,V o,UpWPUV O*+ ROV)WOp,j V)*j oj RpOLO2Q *1 WLUp2 ). *PU 2U*m1,M:+ “P1+*OLU
m1,M U2(O,124U2*d” 186 In 2016, a former anchor at the company sued Fox
News Chairman Roger Ailes for sexual harassment and retaliation. During
the ensuing eighteen months several more women came forward with
allegations. The Retirement System suit alleges the sexually charged
environment should not have been invisible to the company. 187 In August
179. Melinda Tuhus, In the Workplace, Power and Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at
CN14.
180. Stephanie Zacharek et al., 2017 Person of the Year: The Silence Breakers, TIME,
Dec. 18, 2017, at 34.
181. Chris Kirkham, Kate O:Keeffe & Susan Pullman, Wynn Resorts Board Gets Scrutiny
After Steve Wynn’s Resignation, WALL ST. J. B1 (Feb. 8, 2018); Elizabeth Winkler, The Board
of Wynn Resorts Needs to Go, Too, WALL ST. J. B12 (Feb. 7, 2018).
182. Kirkham et al., supra note 181.
183. Chris Kirkham & Kate O:Keefe, Nevada Regulator, Inundated With Reports About
Steve Wynn, Starts Website to Field Tips, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/nevada-regulator-inundated-with-reports-about-steve-wynn-starts-hotline-for-tips1518452745 [https://perma.cc/HS3P-6PJQ].
184. Winkler, supra note 181, at B12.
185. Id. Winkler notes that the board has not taken any responsibility for the alleged abuse
of female employees and only reluctantly accepted his resignation.
186. Keach Hagey, Fox Creates Advisory Committee in Settlement of Shareholder
Complaint Over Sexual Harassment, WALL ST. J. B6 (Nov. 20, 2017).
187. Id. “In a series of highly public scandals and settlements,” many top executives and
on-air personalities left. Id.
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2017, the company reported it had paid $50 million in costs and fees related
to sexual harassment suits. It also paid Ailes an exit package of more than
$40 million. The Retirement System also sued for unjust enrichment of Ailes
estate.188 As part of a settlement agreement of the Retirement System suit,
Fox set up an outside council to help change its culture. 189
Sexual harassment lawsuits resulting in a payout are usually
accompanied by a secrecy agreement. Weinstein, among other prominent
men who have paid settlements, used secrecy agreements to keep their
reputations untarnished. 190 In light of this, Congress is considering a bill that
would negate such agreements, as are several states. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, Arizona, California, Florida, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia have
proposed legislation regarding secrecy agreements. 191 These bills are often
part of a package designed to facilitate harassment claims. They can also go
beyond harassment to deal with related claims such as discrimination and
retaliation.192 A+ +)WPf *PUj mOLL LO4O* p W14.p2j:+ 1.*O12+ R1, VURU2VO2Q p2V
resolving workplace disputes and raise the vulnerability of boards who fail
*1 412O*1, *PUO, W14.p2j:+ URR1,*+ O2 *PO+ ,UQp,Vd
An additional legislative effort by some states such as California, New
Jersey, New York, and Washington is limiting the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements in employee contracts. 193 In Washington, for
example, the bill is part of a package of bills designed to address sexual
harassment. 194 The use of mandatory arbitration agreements has grown
p22)pLLjf O2 .p,* oUWp)+U 1R *PU ;d>d >).,U4U !1),*:+ +*,12Q .,URU,U2WU R1,
arbitration over litigation. 195 Although arbitration has some advantages in
188. Id. The suit was settled in November.
189. Id.
190. Cannon, supra note 166.
191. Agueda Pacheco-Flores, Legislation in Olympia targets sexual harassment in the
workplace, SEATTLE TIMES, (updated Mar. 20, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.c
om/seattle-news/politics/legislation-in-olympia-targets-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace/
[https://perma.cc/WU8F-XVG4].
192. Maxine Neuhauser, NJ Bill Could Make Resolving Employment Disputes Tougher,
LAW 360 (Jan. 5, 2018).
193. Braden Campbell, States Act To Quell Harassment as #MeToo Momentum Surges,
LAW 360 (Jan. 10, 2018).
194. Pacheco-Flores, supra note 191. Another bill would create a group to develop model
practices. Microsoft recently announced that it was ending a practice requiring employees to
agree to arbitration of sexual harassment suits.
195. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that only
employment contracts of transportation workers were exempted from the Federal Arbitration
Act); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-2990, 2003 WL 21077048 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff employee was required arbitrate her claims against
defendant shipping company according to the arbitration agreement); see also Norman D.
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that it is often cheaper and quicker than litigation, it is also private (an
advantage for employers). In areas which have an important impact on
public policy and society, such as sexual harassment and other forms of
discrimination, mandatory arbitration of claims means that it is very difficult
if not impossible to tell the extent of discriminatory practices and which
employers are engaging in them. The proposed state legislation will help
shine light on the issue.
This is not an exclusive list of actions legislatures are considering
taking. For example, some states have, or are considering, extending the
statute of limitations in sexual assault cases. 196 Others are strengthening their
whistleblower and anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public
participation) protections. 197 What seems clear is that boards need to pay
closer attention to sexual harassment in their organizations and work to
change the company culture. This is true not just for liability purposes, but
failure to do so can have a significant effect on the bottom line. Cities198 and
pension funds have stated they will be reluctant to invest in companies with
poor records on gender issues. 199
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR PROMOTING BETTER LEADERSHIP
AND GENDER D IVERSITY

A. Changing Company Norms
It seems clear that boards that ignore the changing views on sexual
harassment and equality in the workplace do so at their – p2V *PU W14.p2j:+
peril. There are a variety of actions a board can take to help the company
adapt and also probably increase the bottom line. The most basic action
centers on ensuring a culture in which people treat each other with respect
and in which they feel free to speak. 200 The focus should be less on legal
Bishara, et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 37, 104-110 (2013) (discussing
several cases in which courts compelled arbitration in whistleblower claims).
196. Wolfe, supra note 165.
197. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Antoinette Bonsignore, Protect #Me Too Victims from
Retaliatory Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES A (updated Jan. 23, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.seatt
letimes.com/opinion/protect-metoo-victims-from-retaliatory-lawsuits/
[https://perma.cc/97A5-HCK9]. SLAPP is designed to prevent citizens who speak up about
matters of public interest from being sued to prevent them from speaking.
198. Sarah Krouse, Chicago Rethinks Investing - Proposed legislation seeks to consider
‘ESG’ factors in investment decisions, WALL ST. J. B10 (Mar. 1, 2018). Chicago is the
country:s third-largest city, and its investment decisions can have an important impact.
199. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Urged to Get Tougher on Sexual Harassment, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 2018, at B6.
200. Workers at the Wynn Resorts blame the culture and warnings not to speak as reasons
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protection and more on creating and or maintaining a place where people
want to work.201 To this end, there are several concrete steps that can be
implemented. The most important step is informing employees that the goals
are coming from the top down. There is consensus that without this,
measures will again be viewed as window dressing and probably
ineffective.202 The board should insist that members of senior management
understand the importance of and agree with the culture tenets, and will help
to implement them. Implementation and results should be part of the
assessment by the board of top personnel and should be part of the salary
determination.203
The message can be reinforced by having board members interact with
employees on certain issues. Ideally, the board should help implement an
open organization where information flows freely among the various
levels.204 This helps facilitate reporting and raising of problems. In larger
organizations, it is likely that the framework for such exchanges already
exists. In response to the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines 205 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,206 among other laws, reporting procedures including
hotlines should be in place. To encourage their use, a board member (most
likely in a video or on-line format) followed by the CEO or some other top
executive, can explain the importance of the goals to the organization, the
kinds of behaviors of particular interest, and what can be expected if reports
are made. Non-retaliation should be stressed. This could be followed by
small group discussions as part of a training exercise led by others lower in
management.
Of equal importance is an established procedure to follow up and
investigate reports, 207 and report back to the individual about appropriate
why the harassment and abuse persisted for so long without action being taken. Alexandra
Berzon, et al., Wynn Accusers Fault Firm Culture - Employees say managers discouraged
complaints or looked the other way, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018), at A1.
201. Bettina Deynes, Vice President for H.R. at the Society for Human Resource
Management, stated, “[t]he motive is not the legal liability but the culture you want,” in
reference to getting employees to report harassment. Miller, supra note 135.
202. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, et al., Encouraging Internal Reporting, 7 COMPLIANCE
& ETHICS PROF:L 26, 27-28 (2010) (discussing research that indicates managers should both
encourage employees to speak out and clearly explain procedures to employees).
203. It does not necessarily follow that an increase in reports should be viewed as a
negative. It can signal that the process is working because there is more trust in the system.
Miller, supra note 135.
204. Dworkin, et al., supra note 202 at 27.
205. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
206. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
207. There should be at least two, if not several venues to report. This increases the

2018]

THE ROLE OF GENDER DIVERSITY

133

action taken. 208 At least annually, if not more often at board meetings, the
board should review whether the procedure is working, the types of reports
received, and whether appropriate action was taken. Another source of
information, the exit interview, could also help stop future problems. The
interviewer should try to ascertain whether retaliation was a cause of the exit,
and if so, this should be reported to the board. 209
A summary of reports and actions taken, issued by the board and made
available to the employees would go a long way to emphasize that the board
is actively interested in an open culture and that the organization is a fair
place to work. The same report, made available to shareholders and potential
investors, could also be helpful to the organization. At this time, special
attention should be paid to reports of harassment. The Council of
Institutional Investors has urged directors to have staff report sexual
harassment to the board and inform the board of every settlement of a
harassment case. 210 ]* +*p*UV *Pp* VO,UW*1,+ +P1)LV oU “.,1(OVO2Q LUpVU,+PO.
on corporate c)L*),Uf O2WL)VO2Q W14op*O2Q +Uk)pL Pp,p++4U2*d” 211 According
to a survey by Boardlist, a marketplace for female board talent in the
technology sector, as of the summer of 2017, 88% of boards had not adopted
a plan to deal with sexual harassment. 212
Adoption of these
recommendations would be helpful in dealing with the issue. 213
B. Changing the Culture through Changing the Numbers
The European Union and its member nations, which so far have seen
the strongest policy action regarding board gender equity, have in recent

likelihood that employees with an issue can find someone they are sufficiently comfortable
with to report.
208. Appropriate action means proportional consequences. Some low-level issues can be
handled with a conversation. See Miller, supra note 135 (discussing best practices for
handling complaints, including rewarding managers when complaints of harassment increase
in their departments).
209. Dworkin, et al., supra note 202, at 28.
210. Id. They also encouraged recouping executive pay from alleged harassers and
revising the rules regarding office romances.
211. Id. The deputy director of the Council of Institutional Investors, Amy Borus, stated
that overall “boards have not been taking a close look at how their companies are managing
the risk of sexual harassment.” Id.
212. Id. The poll covered 414 people, virtually all of whom serve on company boards.
213. Several other institutional investors such as Black Rock are putting pressure on
boards to change their organizations: culture. Krouse, supra note 198 See also Lublin, supra
note 173; Sarah Krouse & Kristen Grind, Fidelity Rethinks Star Managers, WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 2018, at A1 (discussing current trends in the business world to overhaul business plans to
remediate cultural issues within companies).
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years pushed hard for gender quotas as a solution to the matter. 214 In 2014,
the European Commission set a target for all publicly listed EU firms to have
a board composed of at least 40% women, while establishing guidelines to
U2+),U *Pp* “-)pLOROWp*O12 p2V 4U,O* ,U4pO2 *PU MUj W,O*U,Opd”215 A wide range
of EU countries have gone ahead with their own sets of legislation, executive
ordinances and other policies meant to promote gender diversity on
boards.216 The results of these efforts have been overall successful, but
concentrated in a few EU states: between 2010 and 2016, female board
membership had overall doubled to 23.3% across the EU, with France and
Italy seeing approximately 25% female representation on boards while
others, like the Czech Republic and Romania, seeing declines in female
board representation. 217 Generally, nations that saw the greatest gains had
enacted hard quotas with specific deadlines, while nations with smaller gains
or declines had enacted weaker, voluntary policies or had taken no policy
action at all.218 These results highlight that although quotas are effective at
rapidly increasing female representation on boards, mere recommendations
or voluntary standards at the national level are not enough to fix the matter.
Opponents of quota systems may claim that quotas may cause firms to
prioritize the gender of the candidate over merit, or otherwise may result in
m14U2 oUO2Q pVVUV 4U,ULj p+ “*1MU2r+qd” 219 Fortunately, there is some
standing research on this matter. Norway implemented aggressive gender
quotas for boards in 2003, and studies have examined its effects. For
example, Elstad & Ladegard note that in the years following the
implementation of the policy, female board members felt they did have
influence on the decisions of the board,220 while another study found no
deleterious effects on financial performance as a result of this policy. 221 It
seems that in practice, the alleged deleterious effects of quota systems do not
manifest: women do not feel like mere tokens, and performance does not
decline (though the authors of the latter study find no significant
improvement in financial performance either, aside from greater capital
214. Jourová, supra note 32.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 6.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id. at 6.
219. See, e.g., Kathleen Elkins, Top JPMorgan Exec: Gender Quotas Are Bad for Women
in Business, CNBC (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/25/top-jpmorgan-execgender-quotas-are-bad-for-women-in-business.html [https://perma.cc/Y9KR-QBJU].
220. Elstad & Ladegard, supra note 65.
221. Monika ZU+iWijC+Mpf Mandatory Quotas for Women on Boards of Directors in the
European Union: Harmful to or Good for Company Performance?, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 35 (Nov. 14, 2017).
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accumulation). This does not mean, of course, that no negative effects exist,
and more research is needed to determine the true effects of these policies.
These studies seem to indicate that it is possible for a well-implemented
quota policy to avoid these negative effects.
Quotas as a solution to disparities have not been allowed in the U.S.
since the 1970s, however. In Regents of University of California, Davis
Medical School v. Baake,222 the Supreme Court, in a fractured opinion, held
that strict quotas were a violation of the equal protection clause. 223 The law
has evolved to the point that private employers may set goals as part of an
affirmative action plan so long as they meet certain requirements, notably
that the plan be flexible, temporary, and address past discrimination or
significant disparities.224 Boards that wish to diversify can encourage use of
an affirmative action plan that may help bring more women into the
organization. They can also indicate priorities for inclusion of women as
part of the group being considered for leadership positions. There is pressure
on boards to take such action.
External pressure to increase the number and advancement of women
is coming from a variety of sources. Investors in the U.S. who oversee about
ten trillion dollar in assets see this as a way to increase profitability and stock
prices, and prevent disasters such as those at Wynn Resorts and the
Weinstein Companies. 225 Interest groups, such as those made up of more
than two dozen CEOs of companies such as LinkedIn Corp. and Newmont
Mining Corp., have signed pledges to create measurable targets for women
at every level and ensure influential senior men sponsor promising women. 226
222. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The case
involved a white applicant to a program who was denied admission even though his test scores
were higher than some of the minority students admitted under a policy that reserved 16 of
the 100 places for minority group members. The school wanted to diversify the student body.
Id. at 276-77.
223. Id. at 320. The Court was split 4-1-4.
224. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (showing the current
state of affirmative action law).
225. Elizabeth Winkler, Why Sexual-Harassment Scandals Matter to Investors, WALL S T.
J., (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/why-sexual-harassment-matters-toinvestors-1512495760 [https://perma.cc/TDN7-L27W]; see also Ken Brown, Real Losers in
Epic Casino Battle were Wynn Shareholders, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/real-losers-in-epic-casino-battle-were-wynnshareholders-1520612121 [https://perma.cc/B5SG-ZBHY].
226. Joann S. Lublin, CEOs’ New Vow: Advancing More Women at Work, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/ceos-new-vow-advancing-more-womenat-work-1481058002 [https://perma.cc/T6W6-TR7X]; see also Dani Burger, ‘SHE’ ETF
debuts as gender diversity lures buyers, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.
seattletimes.com/business/she-etf-debuts-as-gender-diversity-lures-buyers/ [https://perma.cc/
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Some celebrities are also bringing pressure to bear. Jana Partners LLC
enlisted Sting to help raise billions of dollars to target companies they feel
should be more socially responsible.227 And Frances McDormand, in
accepting her Oscar at the 2018 Academy Awards ceremony, suggested
inclusion riders in contracts when individuals have sufficient bargaining
power to do so.228
C. Creating a More Inclusive Work Environment
Given the challenges and factors restricting gender diversity in the
workplace, this Part addresses some ways businesses can work toward a
more gender inclusive work environment. Cindy White, a professional
writer who also spent several years in mid-management positions for a
Fortune 500 company, highlights the need to take action and implement
policies that work to reduce gender inequalities in a work environment. 229
In sum, White advocates providing training on gender equality to
management, providing employees with quality on-site child care facilities,
+P1mWp+O2Q *PU RO,4:+ +)WWU++R)L m14U2f p2V .)oLOWOiO2Q *PU RO,4:+ URR1,*+
of gender inclusiveness. 230 Furthermore, she explains the need for
fundamental change through policies that ensure women and men are
compensated equally for the same work, allow both men and women to enjoy
a work-life balance, and forbid any form of sexual harassment. 231 Hence,
White advocates institutional changes through company policies including
creating opportunities for women to be recognized and rewarded in the
workplace.232
Similarly, Xuan Minh Hoang, an executive at an employer branding
agency in London, identifies four specific steps for improving gender
57G7-ZBNU] (explaining how gender diversity can attract investors).
227. David Benoit, Wall Street Fighters, Do-Gooders & And Sting & Converge in New Jana
Fund, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/wall-street-fighters-dogoodersand-stingconverge-in-new-jana-fund-1515358929 [https://perma.cc/5KZL-ANAS].
228. Debra Cassens Weiss, Frances McDormand Has People Asking: What Is an
Inclusion Rider?, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
frances_mcdormand_has_people_asking_what_is_an_inclusion_rider [https://perma.cc/LG
M7-72U9]. An inclusion rider in a contract, according to her, means that “you can ask for
and/or demand at least 50 percent” of the people in non-star roles and those working on the
movie represent the demography of the venue where the film is taking place. Id.
229. Cindy White, How to Promote Gender Equality in the Workplace, CHRON. (Mar. 17,
2016, updated Aug. 8, 2018), http://work.chron.com/promote-gender-equality-workplace10258.html [https://perma.cc/S3FZ-R7BK].
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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diversity in the workplace. 233 Her strategies include improving transparency
in pay, acknowledging p2V WPpLLU2QO2Q 12U:+ 1m2 oOp+f R1+*U,O2Q *PU 2Uk*
female leaders, and supporting parents. 234
D. Structural Factors
Other researchers have examined how factors which create hostile
environments for female leaders are more deeply rooted than previously
believed, and would be difficult to solve merely by individual firms. Self.,141*O12f 1, *PU .,pW*OWU 1R POQPLOQP*O2Q 12U:+ 1m2 pWW14.LO+P4U2*+f O+
W,O*OWpL *1 pV(p2WU4U2*+ O2 *PU o)+O2U++ m1,LVf jU* “m14U2 Uk.U,OU2WU +1WOpL
and economic penalties (i.e. backlash) for self-promotion, a behavior that
(O1Lp*U+ RU4pLU QU2VU, +*U,U1*j.U+d” 235 Corinne A. Moss-Racusin and Laurie
A. Rudman found that fear was the driving factor in limiting self-promotion
among female subjects in their study, and that this fear is not experienced
nearly to the same degree by male subjects. The researchers, however, also
found that female subjects were more capable of peer-promotion, or
promoting the accomplishments or merit of their peers and coworkers. 236 In
light of these findings, they suggest several local solutions in the face of
stereotypes that could take many years to change: weighting peer evaluations
in the hiring or promotion process, or offering training to promote
“pmp,U2U++ p2V URRUW*O(U 4p2pQU4U2* 1R opWMLp+P *P,Up*+” R1, O2VOviduals in
the workplace.237
Many of the obstacles women face, both in terms of backlash effects
and general evaluation of others, seem to be rooted in gender stereotypes
clashing with what is considered to be good leadership. Research by Victoria
L. Brescoll, Erica Dawson and Eric Luis Uhlman found that female leaders
face a variety of minefields in handling emotional expression, which in turn
strongly affect how others evaluate them as leaders. 238 Their research finds
a disparity between stereotypical female traits (more communal, less agentic)
and the traits held by successful leaders.239 Both embracing the stereotypical
233. Xuan Minh Hoang, 4 Ways to Promote Gender Equality in the Workplace,
UNDERCOVERRECRUITER : EMPLOYER (2015), https://theundercoverrecruiter.com/gender-eq
uality-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/7X48-2JYV].
234. Id.
235. Corinne A. Moss-Racusin & Laurie A. Rudman, Disruptions in Women’s SelfPromotion: The Backlash Avoidance Model, 34 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 186 (2010).
236. Id. at 199.
237. Id. at 200.
238. Victoria L. Brescoll et al., Hard Won and Easily Lost: The Fragile Status of Leaders
in Gender-Stereotype-Incongruent Occupations, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1640 (2010).
239. Id. at 416.
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communal traits and adopting the stereotypically leadership-oriented agentic
traits are, however, poor strategies for women: the former frequently results
in the female subject being perceived as too emotional, while the latter is
commonly associated with perceptions of coldness, which is not the case
with otherwise similar male subjects. 240 Furthermore, once female leaders
are conveyed status, even minor perceived slip-ups result in significantly
more negative views of them than there would be of male leaders who make
similarly minor mistakes. 241 Displaying anger is an especially significant
taboo for female leaders while male leaders are expected to express
occasional emotional outrage. The Brescoll et al. experiments show that a
ROW*O12pL “p2Q,j RU4pLU rLUpVU,q mp+ N)VQUV *1 oU *PU LUp+* W14.U*U2* 1R pLL
the targets, including not just the high- and low-status angry men, but also
the low-status p2Q,j RU4pLU *p,QU*d” 242 Citing evidence that these biases are
“12U 1R *PU +*,12QU+* QU2VU, +*U,U1*j.U+ PULV O2 7U+*U,2 W)L*),U+f” 243 the
,U+Up,WPU,+ pL+1 +)QQU+* *PU Uk.p2+O12 1R “O2R1,4p*O12 p2V VO+W)ssion about
the ways that gender-U41*O12 +*U,U1*j.U+ PO2VU, m14U2:+ poOLO*j *1 +)WWUUV
O2 LUpVU,+PO. ,1LU+” mO*PO2 W14.p2j *,pO2O2Q .,1Q,p4+d 244 A wide range of
evidence implies that the gender socialization begins early in childhood 245 as
early as preschool, 246 and is tied to parental attitudes 247 as well as the broader
cultural environment. 248 This suggests that workplace training may be too
little, too late to ameliorate the situation, and that broader social policies
meant to target the root of the problem may be the most effective solution in
the long term.
E. Concerns Regarding Motives for Reform
Much of the work on gender equality on the board has focused on
240. Id. at 421.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 422.
243. Id. at 415.
244. Id. at 425.
245. See Susan M. McHale et al., Family Context and Gender Role Socialization in Middle
Childhood: Comparing Girls to Boys and Sisters to Brothers, 70 CHILD DEV. 990 (1999)
(analyzing the results of study of the extent of sex-typing during different periods of childhood
development).
246. Erin R. Baker et al., What Can Boys and Girls Do? Preschoolers’ Perspective
Regarding Gender Roles across Domains of Behavior, 19 SOC. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 23 (2016).
247. Hillary Paul Halpern & Maureen Perry-Jenkins, Parents’ Gender Ideology and
Gendered Behavior as Predictors of Children’s Gender-Role Attitudes: A Longitudinal
Exploration, 74 SEX ROLES 527 (2016).
248. See, e.g., Euan Robertson, Media Gender Stereotypes and Interpretations by Female
Generation Y, F. ON PUB. POL:Y (2010).
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improvements in financial performance as a result of improved gender
balance, hence many researchers at least implicitly argue that firms should
strive to improve gender balance in order to improve financial performance.
The focus on financial results is understandable. As Isidro & Sobral write,
“O* O+ )+)pLLj +pOV *Pp* RO,4+ mOLL p..1O2* 41,U m14U2 *1 *Peir boards only if
doing so results in economic benefits for the firm . . . for that reason, the bulk
of academic research investigates the economic outcomes for firms that have
RU4pLU VO,UW*1,+ 12 *PUO, o1p,V+d” 249 Yet, public policy should be largely
motivated by ethical or egalitarian concerns rather than concerns over
W1,.1,p*U .U,R1,4p2WUd ]2 JbKHf *PU a),1.Up2 ;2O12:+ !144O++O12U, 12
\)+*OWU +*p*UV *Pp* *PU ;2O12:+ pQQ,U++O(U .1LOWj .)+P *1 U2W1),pQU 41,U
female board members was driven by an understa2VO2Q *Pp* “QU2VU, U-)pLO*j
is not an option, it is not a luxury, it is an imperative. That is why Europe
needs strong rules to tackle the gender imbalance in company
o1p,V,114+d” 250
tU+.O*U *PO+ +*p*U4U2* *P1)QPf “r*qPU ra),1.Up2q !144O++O12:+
reasoning underlying the draft Directive [on gender equity on boards] is so
strongly pervaded by economic considerations that it gives the impression
*Pp* m14U2 p,U 4U,ULj O2+*,)4U2*+ )+UR)L *1 p**pO2 UW1214OW 1oNUW*O(U+d” 251
Dr. Marek Szydlo points out that jurisdictions like the European Union,
which have pushed especially strongly for gender parity on boards, 252 have
substantive legal bases to push for such parity, for example on the basis of
*PU a;:+ R)2Vp4U2*pL ,OQP* 1R U-)pLO*j oU*mUU2 4U2 p2V m14U2d 253
Nevertheless, the EU and other similar institutions frequently rely on the
business case as a source of legitimacy, if not the fundamental driving force
behind such policies.254 This raises a natural concern:
]* 4pj oU *Pp* *PU Uk.UW*UV UW1214OW oU2URO*+ 1R m14U2:+ O2W,eased
participation on the boards of companies in the future will not materialize
(and, in fact, it is doubtful that they will materialize at all). Would this
indicate that gender equality on the boards of companies is unnecessary and
unfounded and should be abolished?255
Thus, it is important to not lose sight of the ethical and egalitarian issues
in play.
249. Isidro & Sobral, supra note 12.
250. Jourová, supra note 32.
251. Marek Szydlo, Constitutional Values Underlying Gender Equality on the Boards of
Companies: How Should the EU Put These Values into Practice?, 63 INT:L & COMP. L. Q.
167 (2014).
252. Jourová, supra note 32.
253. Id. at 178.
254. Id. at 179.
255. Id. at 180.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, the evidence regarding female board representation and firm
performance has strengthened over recent years, but any direct relationship
remains ambiguous. Various studies, as discussed above, suggest that
female representation on corporate boards has a causal relationship with
certain indirect indicators of firm valuation and performance, for example,
commitment to ethical standards and CSR practices. Additionally, women
who make it to these upper leadership roles tend to be more diversely skilled
than their male counterparts, contributing to the widely observed positive
relationship between female board representation and firm performance.
However, a range of confounding factors and covariates makes the
establishment of strong, direct and causal relationships between these two
factors difficult at the present time.
On the whole, there is gender inequality in opportunities for
promotions, feedback from managers, and overall participation. Many
studies have found that women contribute to organizations in numerous ways
enabling firms to experience increased profitability, and better financial
ratios and indicators. Yet, with these benefits, there are still limitations for
women attempting to enter both entry-level and managerial positions. Some
reasons identified for the disparity are that women tend not to apply for jobs
)2LU++ *PUj p,U p “W11MOU W)**U,” RO*f they have insufficient growth
opportunities and promotions, and women in senior positions tend to leave
their jobs because of work pressure, gender bias and lack of work-life
balance. Furthermore, we also see challenges of gender inclusiveness in the
work.LpWUf +)WP p+f LpWM 1R p+j44U*,j oU*mUU2 m14U2:+ p2V 4U2:+ (pL)U+
and priorities at work and differing gender linguistic styles in the work
environment.
There has been some success with quota systems in the EU in
promoting gender diversity on boards in some nations, though the relative
recency of these policies and disparity in their effectiveness indicates that
more work must be done to determine how to best implement them. Yet,
government-mandated quotas are not a viable option in the U.S.
Regardless of whether a so-called business case can be established
regarding the effect of women in leadership on corporate performance,
gender equality is a fundamental right and the environment which seems to
block the pathways for women to positions of organizational leadership can
be changed. As discussed above, we advocate changing company norms
which include creating a culture in which people treat each other with respect
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and in which they feel free to speak. 256 Along these lines, claims of sexual
harassment need to be reported up the chain to the board and shareholder
levels, and need to be acted upon. Furthermore, silence should not be
required as part of any settlement agreement with employees.
In addition, although a system of quotas as required by many European
countries would face legal obstacles in the U.S., private employers should
set gender goals to address past discrimination. The bottom line is that
business can and should create a more gender-inclusive work environment
for employees with opportunities for women to participate in corporate
governance.

256. See Berzon et al., supra note 200 (describing how workers at the Wynn Resorts blame
the culture and warnings not to speak as reasons why the harassment and abuse persisted for
so long without action being taken). See generally, Frances J. Milliken, Cindy A. Schipani,
& Terry Morehead Dworkin, The Impact of Employment Law and Practices on Business and
Society: The Significance of Worker Voice, 19 PA. J. OF BUS. L.979 (2016-17) (analyzing the
significance of voice in the workplace).

